Identity Flow Visualizer

Walk a federated login one message at a time. Both flows, and the signature-wrapping attack their checks defeat, are below in full.

Rendered when the site was built. No JavaScript required. With JavaScript on, this is replaced by an interactive stepper over the same flows.

SAML 2.0: SP-initiated Web Browser SSO

Participants: Browser · Service Provider · Identity Provider.

SAML 2.0: SP-initiated Web Browser SSO: 7 steps
Step	From	To	Binding	What happens
1	Browser	Service Provider	HTTP GET	Browser requests a protected resource
2	Service Provider	Browser	HTTP-Redirect	SP returns an AuthnRequest, redirecting to the IdP
3	Browser	Identity Provider	HTTP GET	Browser follows the redirect to the IdP SSO endpoint
4	Identity Provider	Identity Provider	user action	The IdP authenticates the user
5	Identity Provider	Browser	HTTP-POST	IdP returns a signed Response with an Assertion
6	Browser	Service Provider	HTTP-POST	Browser POSTs the SAMLResponse to the SP's ACS
7	Service Provider	Service Provider	validation	SP validates the Assertion and establishes a session

1. Browser requests a protected resource

From
Browser

To
Service Provider

Binding
HTTP GET
```
GET https://sp.example.com/protected
(no session cookie yet)
```
Why it matters: Unauthenticated, so the SP starts SSO instead of serving the resource.

2. SP returns an AuthnRequest, redirecting to the IdP

From: Service Provider
To: Browser
Binding: HTTP-Redirect

<samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
    ID="_a1b2c3d4" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2026-07-23T12:00:00Z"
    Destination="https://idp.example.com/sso"
    AssertionConsumerServiceURL="https://sp.example.com/acs"
    ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST">
  <saml:Issuer>https://sp.example.com/metadata</saml:Issuer>
</samlp:AuthnRequest>

Why it matters: The <AuthnRequest> is sent through the browser (HTTP-Redirect binding); RelayState carries the original URL to return to.

3. Browser follows the redirect to the IdP SSO endpoint

From
Browser

To
Identity Provider

Binding
HTTP GET
```
GET https://idp.example.com/sso?SAMLRequest=<deflated+base64>&RelayState=/protected
```
Why it matters: The IdP, not the SP, authenticates the user; the SP never sees the password.
4. The IdP authenticates the user

From
Identity Provider

To
Identity Provider

Binding
user action
```
(the user signs in at the IdP, out of band)
```
Why it matters: Authentication happens entirely at the IdP; MFA/step-up policy lives here.

5. IdP returns a signed Response with an Assertion

From: Identity Provider
To: Browser
Binding: HTTP-POST

<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
    ID="_r9x8" InResponseTo="_a1b2c3d4" IssueInstant="2026-07-23T12:00:30Z"
    Destination="https://sp.example.com/acs">
  <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com/metadata</saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature>…IdP signature over the Assertion…</ds:Signature>
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" IssueInstant="2026-07-23T12:00:30Z">
    <saml:Subject>
      <saml:NameID Format="…emailAddress">[email protected]</saml:NameID>
      <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="…bearer">
        <saml:SubjectConfirmationData Recipient="https://sp.example.com/acs"
            NotOnOrAfter="2026-07-23T12:05:00Z" InResponseTo="_a1b2c3d4"/>
      </saml:SubjectConfirmation>
    </saml:Subject>
    <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2026-07-23T12:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2026-07-23T12:05:00Z">
      <saml:AudienceRestriction>
        <saml:Audience>https://sp.example.com/metadata</saml:Audience>
      </saml:AudienceRestriction>
    </saml:Conditions>
    <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2026-07-23T12:00:30Z"/>
  </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>

Why it matters: The IdP signs the Response/Assertion. Delivered as an auto-submitting HTML form the browser POSTs to the SP's ACS.

6. Browser POSTs the SAMLResponse to the SP's ACS

From
Browser

To
Service Provider

Binding
HTTP-POST
```
POST https://sp.example.com/acs
SAMLResponse=<base64>&RelayState=/protected
```
Why it matters: The response travels through the browser (front-channel), which is why the signature + Conditions checks below matter.
7. SP validates the Assertion and establishes a session

From
Service Provider

To
Service Provider

Binding
validation
```
checks: XML signature · NotBefore/NotOnOrAfter · AudienceRestriction · Recipient · InResponseTo
result: session established for [email protected]
```
Why it matters: Signature = authenticity/integrity; NotOnOrAfter = replay window; AudienceRestriction = this token is for THIS SP; InResponseTo = binds the response to our request (CSRF).

OpenID Connect: Authorization Code + PKCE

Participants: Browser · Relying Party · OpenID Provider.

OpenID Connect: Authorization Code + PKCE: 7 steps
Step	From	To	Binding	What happens
1	Relying Party	Relying Party	client-side	RP generates state, nonce, and a PKCE verifier
2	Browser	OpenID Provider	HTTP-Redirect	Browser is redirected to the OP /authorize endpoint
3	OpenID Provider	OpenID Provider	user action	The OP authenticates the user and gets consent
4	OpenID Provider	Browser	HTTP-Redirect	OP redirects back with an authorization code
5	Relying Party	OpenID Provider	back-channel	RP exchanges the code at the OP /token endpoint
6	OpenID Provider	Relying Party	back-channel	OP returns the tokens (id_token is a JWT)
7	Relying Party	Relying Party	validation	RP validates the id_token and establishes a session

1. RP generates state, nonce, and a PKCE verifier

From
Relying Party

To
Relying Party

Binding
client-side
```
state         = af0ifjsldkj
nonce         = n-0S6_WzA2Mj
code_verifier = dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
code_challenge = base64url(SHA-256(verifier))
              = E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM
```
Why it matters: PKCE binds the later token request to THIS browser session, so an intercepted code is useless without the verifier.

2. Browser is redirected to the OP /authorize endpoint

From: Browser
To: OpenID Provider
Binding: HTTP-Redirect

GET https://op.example.com/authorize?
  response_type=code&
  client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
  redirect_uri=https://rp.example.com/cb&
  scope=openid%20profile&
  state=af0ifjsldkj&
  nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj&
  code_challenge_method=S256&
  code_challenge=<see step 1>

Why it matters: state defends against CSRF on the redirect back; nonce will defend against id_token replay/injection.

3. The OP authenticates the user and gets consent

From
OpenID Provider

To
OpenID Provider

Binding
user action
```
(the user signs in + consents at the OP, out of band)
```
Why it matters: As in SAML, only the OP sees the credentials; the RP never does.
4. OP redirects back with an authorization code

From
OpenID Provider

To
Browser

Binding
HTTP-Redirect
```
302 https://rp.example.com/cb?code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA&state=af0ifjsldkj
```
Why it matters: The RP MUST verify `state` equals the value it sent before using the code.
5. RP exchanges the code at the OP /token endpoint

From
Relying Party

To
OpenID Provider

Binding
back-channel
```
POST https://op.example.com/token
  grant_type=authorization_code&
  code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA&
  redirect_uri=https://rp.example.com/cb&
  client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
  code_verifier=dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
```
Why it matters: Back-channel (server-to-server). The OP recomputes SHA-256(code_verifier) and checks it equals the code_challenge from step 2.

6. OP returns the tokens (id_token is a JWT)

From: OpenID Provider
To: Relying Party
Binding: back-channel

{ "token_type":"Bearer", "expires_in":3600,
  "access_token":"…opaque…",
  "id_token":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL29wLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwic3ViIjoiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxMDAxIiwiYXVkIjoiczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsImV4cCI6MTc4NDgxMTYzMCwiaWF0IjoxNzg0ODA4MDMwLCJub25jZSI6Im4tMFM2X1d6QTJNaiJ9.VEShuk8FS57R9KJx423ka6egOxSeHDECdeSSgdnaOAw" }

decoded id_token:
header  = {
  "alg": "HS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
payload = {
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "exp": 1784811630,
  "iat": 1784808030,
  "iss": "https://op.example.com",
  "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
  "sub": "248289761001"
}
signature = real HS256 HMAC over header.payload, keyed with the demo client_secret "demo-client-secret"

Why it matters: The id_token is the OIDC addition over plain OAuth2: it is an assertion of *authentication*, verified below.

7. RP validates the id_token and establishes a session

From
Relying Party

To
Relying Party

Binding
validation
```
checks: signature (recompute the HS256 HMAC with the client_secret) · iss=https://op.example.com · aud=s6BhdRkqt3 · exp not passed · nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj (matches step 1)
result: session established for sub 248289761001
```
Why it matters: aud must equal our client_id (token wasn't minted for someone else); nonce must equal what we sent (not a replayed/injected token).

XML Signature Wrapping: the attack these checks defeat

A synthetic, seeded demonstration. Every identifier below is invented, no real assertion or key is involved, and nothing here is a working exploit: it is the shape of the attack that makes step 7's signature check insufficient on its own. The wrapped response carries a signature that genuinely verifies.

XSW: original assertion hidden in ds:Signature/ds:Object

1. The Identity Provider signs one assertion

<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">

<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">

Why it matters: This is a real, honest login: the attacker signs in as themselves and keeps the response. Both sides hold the same synthetic document, and the signature's Reference URI names exactly one element.

2. The attacker moves the signed assertion out of the way
```
<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">
```
```
<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
    <ds:Object>
      <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">
```
Why it matters: Nothing has been altered. The signed assertion is still present and still byte-for-byte what the Identity Provider produced; it has only been moved into the signature's own <ds:Object> container. A signature over an element says what the element is, never where in the document it sits.

3. A forged assertion takes its place

<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">

<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <saml:Assertion ID="_evil1" NameID="[email protected]">
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
    <ds:Object>
      <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">

Why it matters: The forgery carries no signature at all, and it does not need one. It only needs to be the element the Service Provider picks up.

4. The Service Provider verifies the signature
```
Reference URI="#_asrt1" resolves.
Digest matches.
SIGNATURE VALID
```
```
Reference URI="#_asrt1" resolves.
Digest matches.
SIGNATURE VALID
```
Why it matters: The verifier follows the reference, finds the original element exactly as it was signed, and reports a valid signature. It is not wrong: that signature really is valid. It simply answers a narrower question than the Service Provider is asking.
5. The Service Provider reads the assertion
```
first <saml:Assertion> found:
  NameID = [email protected]
session established for [email protected]
```
```
first <saml:Assertion> found:
  NameID = [email protected]
session established for [email protected]
```
Why it matters: Two lookups, two answers. The verifier resolved the assertion by reference; the application found it by name. Where those disagree, the attacker chooses who you are logged in as.

6. The checks that defeat it

[PASS] The XML signature verifies
      Reference URI="#_asrt1" resolves to a <saml:Assertion> that has not been altered, so the digest matches and the signature is valid.
[PASS] The assertion read is the assertion signed
      The first <saml:Assertion> found is ID="_asrt1", the one the signature covers.
[PASS] The response carries exactly one assertion
      1 <saml:Assertion> elements. The SAML schema allows a response to carry more than one, which is what leaves room to hide the original.
[PASS] Every assertion is a direct child of the response
      No assertion is buried inside another element.

[PASS] The XML signature verifies
      Reference URI="#_asrt1" resolves to a <saml:Assertion> that has not been altered, so the digest matches and the signature is valid.
[FAIL] The assertion read is the assertion signed
      The first <saml:Assertion> found is ID="_evil1" (NameID [email protected]); the signature covers ID="_asrt1". The Service Provider would trust an element nobody signed.
[FAIL] The response carries exactly one assertion
      2 <saml:Assertion> elements. The SAML schema allows a response to carry more than one, which is what leaves room to hide the original.
[FAIL] Every assertion is a direct child of the response
      ID="_asrt1" is nested under samlp:Response > ds:Signature > ds:Object. An assertion the signature covers should never need a hiding place.

Why it matters: Resolve the assertion through the signature's own reference rather than by tag name, reject a response carrying more than one assertion, and read the same document the verifier read. A valid signature is a fact about an element, not a licence to trust whatever the parser hands back.

XSW: original assertion hidden in the forged saml:Advice

1. The Identity Provider signs one assertion

<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">

<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">

2. The attacker moves the signed assertion out of the way
```
<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">
```
```
<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Advice>
    <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">
```
Why it matters: Nothing has been altered. The signed assertion is still present and still byte-for-byte what the Identity Provider produced; it has only been moved into a <saml:Advice> wrapper, which the next step hangs off the forged assertion. A signature over an element says what the element is, never where in the document it sits.

3. A forged assertion takes its place

<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">

<samlp:Response ID="_r9x8">
  <saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature Reference URI="#_asrt1">
  <saml:Assertion ID="_evil1" NameID="[email protected]">
    <saml:Advice>
      <saml:Assertion ID="_asrt1" NameID="[email protected]">

Why it matters: The forgery carries no signature at all, and it does not need one. It only needs to be the element the Service Provider picks up.

4. The Service Provider verifies the signature
```
Reference URI="#_asrt1" resolves.
Digest matches.
SIGNATURE VALID
```
```
Reference URI="#_asrt1" resolves.
Digest matches.
SIGNATURE VALID
```
Why it matters: The verifier follows the reference, finds the original element exactly as it was signed, and reports a valid signature. It is not wrong: that signature really is valid. It simply answers a narrower question than the Service Provider is asking.
5. The Service Provider reads the assertion
```
first <saml:Assertion> found:
  NameID = [email protected]
session established for [email protected]
```
```
first <saml:Assertion> found:
  NameID = [email protected]
session established for [email protected]
```
Why it matters: Two lookups, two answers. The verifier resolved the assertion by reference; the application found it by name. Where those disagree, the attacker chooses who you are logged in as.

6. The checks that defeat it

[PASS] The XML signature verifies
      Reference URI="#_asrt1" resolves to a <saml:Assertion> that has not been altered, so the digest matches and the signature is valid.
[PASS] The assertion read is the assertion signed
      The first <saml:Assertion> found is ID="_asrt1", the one the signature covers.
[PASS] The response carries exactly one assertion
      1 <saml:Assertion> elements. The SAML schema allows a response to carry more than one, which is what leaves room to hide the original.
[PASS] Every assertion is a direct child of the response
      No assertion is buried inside another element.

[PASS] The XML signature verifies
      Reference URI="#_asrt1" resolves to a <saml:Assertion> that has not been altered, so the digest matches and the signature is valid.
[FAIL] The assertion read is the assertion signed
      The first <saml:Assertion> found is ID="_evil1" (NameID [email protected]); the signature covers ID="_asrt1". The Service Provider would trust an element nobody signed.
[FAIL] The response carries exactly one assertion
      2 <saml:Assertion> elements. The SAML schema allows a response to carry more than one, which is what leaves room to hide the original.
[FAIL] Every assertion is a direct child of the response
      ID="_asrt1" is nested under samlp:Response > saml:Assertion > saml:Advice. An assertion the signature covers should never need a hiding place.

Two of these artifacts have a tool to themselves: the JWT Decoder opens an id_token of your own into its header and claims, and the X.509 Certificate Analyzer reads the certificate whose key signs a SAML assertion, down to its validity window and SANs.

About this lab5 paragraphs

SAML 2.0 (SP-initiated Web Browser SSO) and OpenID Connect (Authorization Code + PKCE) cover every redirect, POST, and back-channel call between the browser, the service/relying party, and the identity/OpenID provider.

Each step shows its decoded message: the SAML AuthnRequest/Assertion, the OIDC /authorize query, the token response and its decoded id_token, with a note on why it matters.

The PKCE code_challenge and the id_token are computed for real from the same crypto the lab uses.

Everything is synthetic; with JavaScript on, the same flows become a stepper you click through in your browser, and they are also available offline via identity-cli.

A third mode, decode your own id_token, needs JavaScript, and its input mounts only behind an OPSEC acknowledgement: an id_token is a live bearer credential, so the field is absent from the page until you have read the warning. It decodes in your browser and never verifies the signature, which would need the provider's key. Offline: identity-cli decode, which reads the token from standard input and never from the command line.

Use it locally This lab has a native command line twin. Build identity-cli from the site's source with:

cargo build --release --bin identity-cli

Source and licence terms

Identity Flow Visualizer

SAML 2.0: SP-initiated Web Browser SSO

1. Browser requests a protected resource

2. SP returns an AuthnRequest, redirecting to the IdP

3. Browser follows the redirect to the IdP SSO endpoint

4. The IdP authenticates the user

5. IdP returns a signed Response with an Assertion

6. Browser POSTs the SAMLResponse to the SP's ACS

7. SP validates the Assertion and establishes a session

OpenID Connect: Authorization Code + PKCE

1. RP generates state, nonce, and a PKCE verifier

2. Browser is redirected to the OP /authorize endpoint

3. The OP authenticates the user and gets consent

4. OP redirects back with an authorization code

5. RP exchanges the code at the OP /token endpoint

6. OP returns the tokens (id_token is a JWT)

7. RP validates the id_token and establishes a session

XML Signature Wrapping: the attack these checks defeat

XSW: original assertion hidden in ds:Signature/ds:Object

1. The Identity Provider signs one assertion

2. The attacker moves the signed assertion out of the way

3. A forged assertion takes its place

4. The Service Provider verifies the signature

5. The Service Provider reads the assertion

6. The checks that defeat it

XSW: original assertion hidden in the forged saml:Advice

1. The Identity Provider signs one assertion

2. The attacker moves the signed assertion out of the way

3. A forged assertion takes its place

4. The Service Provider verifies the signature

5. The Service Provider reads the assertion

6. The checks that defeat it